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Abstract 
 
Too Heavy to be Popular?: 
Lay Theories about Weight and Social Status in Adolescence 
 
Hae Yeon Lee, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
Supervisor: David S. Yeager 
 
Abstract: The present research examines causal lay theories about the relation between 
weight and social status in adolescence. We hypothesize that these causal schemata are 
expected to manifest in social information processing in the presence of weight and social 
status cues. Participants include 80 ninth grade adolescents and 203 college adults. First, 
in probabilistic judgment scenarios (Part 1), we show that participants expect statistical 
covariation between weight and social status when inferring others’ social status. Next, in 
a weight social categorization task (Part 2), participants were more likely to use weight 
cues to categorize people when they were presented with cues that were inconsistent with 
their lay theories (e.g., weight causes certain social status). Lastly, in a weight attribution 
task (Part 3), young adults tended to make more negative, dispositional attribution to 
overweight targets relative to thin targets when interpreting ambiguously-caused negative 
social events. As an initial test of the developmental process model, the findings support 
our theoretical predictions that adolescents’ and young adults’ causal lay theories about 
weight and social status serve as mental models that guide social information processing 
in judgment of others’ social status.  
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INTRO 
In contemporary societies, children and adolescents are flooded with societal 
messages portraying weight as a measure for one’s social status. Past research (Crosnoe & 
Muller, 2004; Gordon, Crosnoe, & Wang, 2013; Puhl & Heuer, 2009) has documented that 
slender individuals tend to gain more social acceptance, perform better in academic and 
occupational settings, entertain more opportunities for romantic relationships, and enjoy 
greater access to medical services than overweight individuals, all of which grant higher 
social status. Meanwhile, popular media often characterize overweight individuals as being 
lazy, less attractive, intellectually less capable, weak-minded, or often rejected by peers 
and romantic partners, all of which signal a connection between overweight status and 
lower social designation in our society.  
Although the psychological salience and importance of weight are substantial in 
everyday life (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993; Major, Eliezer, & Rieck, 2012), little is 
known in terms of how children and adolescents conceptualize weight as social information 
about a person’s status, and how it may change with development. Broadly speaking, 
existing literatures on weight predominantly focus on clinical samples who are at risk of 
childhood and adolescent obesity (Daniels, 2006; Nader et al., 2006), eating disorders 
(Bearman, Presnell, Martinez, & Stice, 2006; McCarthy, 1990; Stice & Bearman, 2001), 
or excessive weight concerns and body image dissatisfaction (Liechty, 2010; Paxton, 
Schutz, Wertheim, & Muir, 1999; Vogt Yuan, 2010). This pathological perspective tends 
to focus on identifying risk factors that are thought to intensify one’s problematic 
cognitions regarding weight and their psychological and health consequences. In addition, 
social psychological research (Burnette, 2010; Crocker et al., 1993; Goffman, 2009; Logel 
& Cohen, 2012; Major et al., 2012; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988) has investigated 
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attitudes, beliefs, and emotions toward overweight individuals with emphasis on stigma 
and stereotypes of obesity. Along the line of this intellectual tradition, the field has not yet 
illuminated the normative social cognitive development processes that may take place 
among children and adolescents with all spectrums of weight ranges. 
In light of this, the present research takes the first step to investigate causal lay 
theories of the relation between weight and social status among adolescents and young 
adults. Our thesis is that individuals do not simply observe statistical covariation between 
weight and social status from their focal environments. Rather, they are able to detect 
statistical patterns between one’s weight and social status, and then begin to form lay 
explanations about this seemingly nonobvious link in an effort to make sense of the world: 
whether and why people with a different weight range have different a social status. Like 
in many other causal mental representations (Bigler & Liben, 2006; Cimpian & Salomon, 
2014; Dodge et al., 2015; Olson & Dweck, 2008; Yeager & Dweck, 2012), these once-
formed lay theories might further develop into more coherent forms of mental 
representations that guide individuals’ social information processing and behavior in 
relevant domains.  
Therefore, our prediction is that post-pubertal adolescents and young adults might 
have already formed coherent causal lay theories about weight and social status (e.g., 
“being heavy/thin causes lower/higher social status”), and these lay theories can be 
assessed by measuring their social information processing tendencies in the presence of 
weight and social status cues. The contribution of the present research is then to 
demonstrate that normative, healthy populations of post-pubertal adolescents and adults 
hold lay theories about weight and social status, and these might affect the ways in which 
they make judgments of others and themselves.   
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In the following section, we begin by reviewing relevant cognitive and social 
cognitive development theories explaining how lay theories are typically formed beginning 
in early childhood, and what developmental function they typically serve.  
First, in cognitive development literatures, our review focuses on essentialism 
beliefs (Gelman, 2003; 2004; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Heyman & Gelman, 2000) and 
inherence heuristic (Cimpian & Erickson, 2012; Cimpian, Mu, & Erickson, 2012; Cimpian 
& Salomon, 2014), which highlight systematic tendencies in causal explanation. Next, in 
social cognitive development literatures, we review developmental intergroup theory 
(Bigler & Liben, 2006; 2007) and implicit theories (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997b; Ross, 
1989; Yeager & Dweck, 2012). Finally, our review discusses important characteristics of 
adolescence development—such as pubertal transition and peer socialization—that may 
spur the development of lay theories about weight and social status.   
The present paper first proposes an initial, developmental, mechanistic process 
model concerning the development of lay theories about weight and social status. Note that 
although we review a full model here, our data do not test it in its entirety. Specifically, we 
do not examine developmental antecedents of lay theories. Instead, we simply document 
the existence of weight-social status lay theories by adolescence, as a first step toward a 
broader investigation of the developmental antecedents of these lay theories in future 
research. 
REASONING ABOUT CAUSAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GROUPS 
Cognitive development literatures (Gelman, 2004; Gopnik, 1998; Gopnik, Sobel, 
Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Heyman & Gelman, 2000) argue that human minds have strong 
tendencies to explain novel objects, entities, or events by forming naïve theories—which 
are called “lay theories” here. Gopnik et al (1999) uses the term “naïve scientists” to 
illustrate how deeply human minds are concerned with explaining underlying causal 
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structures of novel entities or events as part of fundamental learning mechanisms. In 
parallel with early childhood research, Ross and Nisbett (1991) note that adults tend to 
form lay theories in an attempt to search for causal explanations of events and make sense 
of the world. These naïve or lay theories help individuals to grasp on what supplies a core 
identity to an entity and what causes an entity to operate in a particular manner.  
Research finds that children and even adults have a proclivity in their conceptual 
and causal reasoning about entities, by predominantly attending to inherent features that 
are thought to constitute the “essence” of the entity (Gelman, 2003; 2004; Medin & Ortony, 
1989). Over numerous studies (Gelman, 2004; Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007; Heyman 
& Gelman, 1999; 2000), research on essentialism beliefs has shown that individuals with 
essentialism beliefs tend to view the traits as stable over time and contexts, driven by 
biological origin (e.g., blood types, brain, DNA), innate or present at birth/infancy, and 
immutable. These biased beliefs are found to exist in a wide range of knowledge including 
biological, social, and psychological entities (see Gelman, 2004 for review).  
In an attempt to understand where these essentialist beliefs come from and why 
people often use them, Cimpian and Salomon (2014) propose the inherence heuristic as a 
cognitive precursor of psychological essentialism. The inherence heuristic (Cimpian & 
Erickson, 2012; Cimpian, Mu, & Erickson, 2012; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) posits that 
individuals initially observe statistical associations between an entity and an event from 
their environments (e.g., boys wear blue whereas girls wear pink), and then begin to search 
for inherent traits of the entity as causal mechanisms of the event (e.g., there might be a 
DNA or an area in the brain that causes girls to prefer pink). In the eyes of the observer, 
these inherent traits are believed to be deep seated and difficult to observe but ultimately 
cause the entity to operate that way. Like any heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), this 
inherence heuristic is often a sensible way to reason, and it can lead people to quickly 
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discern true answers given limited existing knowledge. Yet it can also lead perceivers 
astray, as when there are no essential characteristics explaining a statistical association 
among social variables (for instance, 100 years ago, blue was more favorable color for 
girls, whereas pink was more for boys; Hooper, 1890). 
Returning to the present interest, the inherence heuristic offers a useful framework 
for understanding individuals’ causal reasoning about the relation between weight and 
social status. Suppose that a child observes an overweight friend being victimized or 
rejected by other peers in the playground. The victimized child may differ in many ways 
from other non-victimized peers, but weight may be particularly salient visually, and may 
even be an explicit reason for the victimization (e.g, calling the child “fat”). Over many 
observations like this, this child might create lay causal explanations, believing that 
“weight” has some inherent characteristics that cause people to dislike them. Indeed, this 
is highly plausible, given mounting empirical evidence pointing to an elevated risk of peer 
victimization and bullying among overweight children and adolescents (Janssen, Craig, 
Boyce, & Pickett, 2004; Puhl, Moss-Racusin, & Schwartz, 2007; Sjöberg, Nilsson, & 
Leppert, 2005). In parallel, a child may see skinny and popular celebrities from TV shows 
and develop causal lay theories, inferring that thin people share some inherent qualities that 
lead people to like them more and confer a higher social designation to them (see Grabe, 
Ward, & Hyde, 2008 for a meta analytic review about the impact of media exposure). 
Although children may not be taught explicitly that “overweight people cannot have 
status,” they may nevertheless infer it on the basis of the nearly ubiquitous social realities 
outlined here.  
These cognitive development theories explain some fundamental cognitive 
tendencies that emerges early in life, as younger children attempt to mold their own causal 
lay theories about psychological entities. Nevertheless, they do not offer clear theoretical 
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predictions on one important question: why might certain psychological traits or entities—
in our case, weight and social status—be far more likely to elicit these biased causal 
theories than others? To answer this question, we review prominent theories in social 
cognitive development research, with a focus on developmental intergroup theory (DIT; 
Bigler & Liben, 2006; 2007) and implicit theories (Chiu et al., 1997b; Ross, 1989; Ross & 
Nisbett, 1991; Yeager & Dweck, 2012).  
DEVELOPMENTAL INTERGROUP THEORY 
Developmental Intergroup Theory (DIT; Bigler & Liben, 2006; 2007) is an 
integrative theoretical model of the precursors of social stereotyping and prejudice. DIT 
supplies some theoretical predictions in terms of why “weight” might be a social dimension 
that engenders causal lay theories and stereotypical thoughts. DIT posits that perceptual 
discriminability heightens the psychological salience of a social dimension (e.g., race, 
gender). The explicit or implicit use of labeling a social characteristic intensifies this. 
According to the DIT, weight might be a psychologically salient social dimension that is 
perceptually distinctive, has proportional group size differences (e.g., individuals differ in 
whether they are obese or very skinny), and some functional languages referring to weight-
relevant characteristics frequently used in daily lives (e.g., fat talk, weight teasing).  
All of these ingredients build up to the expectation that if one can notice differences 
and widely talk about the social attribute, it is far more likely that people begin to treat 
others differently on the basis of the group membership. Bigler et al (1997) has 
demonstrated that functional use of group membership (e.g., “yellow” vs. “blue” groups), 
regardless of whether the group was assigned on the basis of biological attributes or random 
selection, is the first step that generates stereotypical thoughts. More recent inherence 
heuristic models (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) expand on this by explaining how functional 
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use of group membership triggers individuals’ cognitive tendencies to search for inherent 
traits as possible explanations for group membership and function. 
Individuals may then use the mentally constructed categories to link to other non-
obvious characteristics that are causally irrelevant. For instance, Bigler et al (1997) 
demonstrated that once “yellow” vs. “blue” groups are subjectively constructed, children 
begin to use different causal explanations about group members’ performance, which are 
indeed causally irrelevant to group categories. These causally unwarranted links between 
social categories (e.g., race, gender) and attributes (e.g., intellectual, attractive, lazy, shy, 
athletic, aggressive) are problematic, mainly because they can create stereotypes and 
prejudice against individuals who belong to these implied groups and further preclude the 
possibility to learn and individualize unobserved characteristics of others. Indeed, past 
research in the DIT (Bigler, 1995; Bigler et al., 1997; Patterson & Bigler, 2006), 
essentialism (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2003), and person 
perception and impression formation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & 
Glas, 1992; Weisman, Johnson, & Shutts, 2014) has converged on the notion that children 
and adults engage in social categorization in terms of race, gender, personality, religion, 
language, and other group-based traits.   
In the context of weight and social status, the following conjecture might be 
possible: children and adolescents observe statistical covariation between weight and social 
status, and use it to categorize people in terms of weight dimension, and then assign 
different status labels. Much research documenting anti-fat stigma, negative stereotypes, 
and discriminatory acts against overweight individuals shows the existence of the end-
product of this process (Brewis, Wutich, Falletta-Cowden, & Rodriguez-Soto, 2011; 
Crocker et al., 1993; Goffman, 2009; Major et al., 2012; Puhl & Heuer, 2009).  
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Our application of DIT and inherence heuristic models to causal lay theories about 
weight and social status may extend present research in several ways.  First, weight might 
be somewhat distinctive from other attributes that are often essentialized—such as sex and 
race—in the sense that perceivers might consider weight as more readily changeable 
(unlike skin color or biological sex characteristics) and relatively less stable over time. 
Furthermore, a group’s status is by its very definition a social construction and therefore a 
shared mental representation. That an entirely socially-constructed group—those who are 
overweight—could have shared stereotypes about a purely mentally represented 
characteristic—social status—is a fascinating test case for DIT and inherence heuristic 
models. The present research also extends DIT models because it highlights how 
stereotypes are not mere mental statistical associations, but rather they are causal theories 
about members of certain groups, as explained next.  
LAY THEORIES CREATE PREDICTABLE PATTERNS OF SOCIAL INFORMATION 
PROCESSING 
Lay theories have been a topic of a tremendous amount of research in social and 
developmental psychology (Gopnik, 1999; Heyman & Gelman, 2000; Molden & Dweck, 
2006; Ross, 1989; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Children and adolescents construct lay theories 
about a wide range of psychological attributes—such as intelligence (Aronson, Fried, & 
Good, 2002; Dweck & Leggett, 1988), willpower (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010), 
personality traits (Beer, 2002; Chiu et al., 1997b; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1999; 
Ross, 1989; Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011; Yeager et al., 2013), 
morality (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997a; Gervey et al., 1999), emotion regulation 
(Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007), and others. Therefore much research in domains 
that are analogous to the present domain points to the patterns of social information 
processing that could be expected by those with a stronger lay theory that weight causes 
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social status.  We outline these commonly-observed implications of a lay theory because 
they directly inform the potential task measures that could assess the presence of a lay 
theory in adolescence.  
Lay theories are analogous to scientific theories.  Lay and scientific theories include 
knowledge (or perceived knowledge) about social reality; they guide the allocation of 
attention to certain types of information/data; and they provide a basis for making causal 
attributions about information/data that they have attended to (Chiu et al., 1997b; Ross, 
1989; Ross & Nisbett, 1991).   
For instance, Levy and Dweck (1999) demonstrated that children’s lay theories 
about malleability of personality traits facilitated the formation of stereotypes based on 
limited observation about the groups (in their case, schools) and led to over-generalize their 
judgment about the groups to other unobserved individuals belonging to the groups. Plaks 
and colleagues (2001) showed that individuals’ lay theories about the malleability of 
human traits affected the degree to which individuals allocated attention to stereotypes 
consistent vs. inconsistent information. Plaks et al (2005) also found that individuals tended 
to experience more anxiety when presented with lay theories-violating information and 
then attempted to reestablish a coherent sense of prediction. In the present study, if 
individuals have formed lay theories that weight causes status, they should first show that 
they are aware of a statistical covariation between weight and social status.  But they should 
also evaluate novel social information differently if it is consistent or inconsistent with 
their causal expectations. Individuals with a lay theory that weight causes social status 
should more readily process novel information in which weight and status are aligned, and 
less readily process information where weight and social status are not aligned.   
Finally, lay and scientific theories provide an explanatory framework for novel 
events, resulting in predictable patterns of attributions for events. In some past research, 
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when children held a lay theory that a person’s goodness or badness could not be changed, 
they were more likely to attribute an ambiguously-caused negative event to one’s deficient 
traits, rather than to circumstances (Chiu et al., 1997b; Heyman & Gelman, 2000; Yeager, 
Miu, Powers, & Dweck, 2013). In the case of weight and social status, a person may 
observe an ambiguously-caused negative social event occurring to a person who is heavier 
or skinnier, and then explain it as having occurred because the person was skinny or heavy, 
rather than looking to situational factors. These well-established implications of lay 
theories—not yet investigated in the context of weight and social status—led to our 
creation of novel cognitive tasks in the present research.  
ADOLESCENCE AS A SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL PERIOD 
According to the account above, when would individuals develop lay theories about 
weight and social status? That is, when should the formation of causal lay theories about 
weight and social status occur developmentally? We view adolescence as a particularly 
important developmental period, mainly due to its increasing emphasis on both weight and 
social status.  
Our prediction is that an overemphasis on weight and social status in adolescence 
(both biologically and sociocontexually) might heighten the likelihood of detecting 
statistical covariation between these two valued dimensions, and further lead adolescents 
to establish stronger causal connection between weight and social status, more so than at 
younger ages. Supporting this conjecture, there is mounting evidence showing that 
adolescence is a vulnerable time, characterized by the increasing prevalence of weight 
concerns, body image dissatisfaction, disordered eating, and risky weight loss behaviors 
(Bearman et al., 2006; Liechty, 2010; Paxton et al., 1999; Stice & Bearman, 2001; Vogt 
Yuan, 2010).  
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A number of global and U.S. representative sample studies (Liechty, 2010; Sabbah 
et al., 2009; Vogt Yuan, 2010) have shown that adolescents increasingly become aware of 
their weight as compared to younger age groups. According to the 2001-2002 Health 
Behavior of School-Aged Children study (HBSC; Sabbah et al., 2009) that analyzed the 
cross-sectional survey data in twenty-four Western countries, the prevalence of body 
dissatisfaction tends to increase with age for both genders starting from 38.9% at age 11, 
41.8% at age 13, and rising up to 54.9% at age 15. These emerging weight-related problems 
in adolescence might stem from changes in the perceptual salience of weight and in the 
importance of social status in adolescence.  
In this regard, a number of factors might serve as important developmental contexts 
that contribute to mold adolescents’ causal lay theories about weight and social status. First, 
we discuss the pubertal transition (Ge, Elder, Regnerus, & Cox, 2001; Markey, 2010; 
Tremblay & Lariviere, 2009). Next, we address sociocontextual factors (Crosnoe, 2002; 
Helms et al., 2014; Rancourt, Choukas-Bradley, Cohen, & Prinstein, 2014; Webb & 
Zimmer-Gembeck, 2013).  
Pubertal Transition and Biological Factors 
The pubertal transition accompanies rapid bodily changes and growth that often 
result in significant weight gain (Markey, 2010; Stice, Maxfield, & Wells, 2003). 
According to the DIT (Bigler & Liben, 2006; 2007), these visible changes in weight and 
individual variations in physical growth rates during the pubertal transition are expected to 
escalate the psychological salience of “weight” dimension among adolescents.  These in 
turn might trigger adolescents to engage in social categorization processes whereby they 
group others in terms of this “meaningful” social cue, and then attach different meanings 
toward them. 
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Combining rapid physical growth and weight gain, the pubertal transition also 
brings dramatic neurobiological and hormonal changes that are known to activate 
adolescents’ vigilance to social status. Recent review papers (Eisenegger, Haushofer, & 
Fehr, 2011; Johnson & Carver, 2012) have summarized that testosterone, a HPG-axis 
hormone that strongly increases during puberty, can create a rapt attention to cues about 
the causes of social success or failure. This testosterone-cued vigilance to social status and 
pursuit of positive social evaluation is increasingly supported by neuroimaging studies 
(Crone & Dahl, 2012; Forbes & Dahl, 2010; Somerville, 2013).  
Given these biological contexts during the pubertal transition, one can posit that 
adolescents might be under the great influence in using inherence heuristic (Cimpian & 
Salomon, 2014) specifically for searching for causal explanations of what causes one to be 
socially successful or not. Because a person’s weight is perceptually salient and highly 
relevant for gaining admiration or avoiding humiliation, it makes a prime candidate for 
being involved in a strong causal lay theory. However, to date there is no empirical 
evidence showing whether pubertal transition fundamentally alters adolescents’ mental 
representations about the link between weight and social status (and we do not provide it 
here).  
Peer Socialization and Socio-Contextual Factors  
Along with biological contexts that adolescents experience through the pubertal 
development, there are socio-contextual changes that might contribute to escalate 
adolescents’ sensitivity to peer social status. Past studies (Barber, Eccles, & Stone, 2001; 
Coleman, 1961; Crosnoe, 2011; Eckert, 1989) that examine adolescent cultures often 
describe teenagers’ common social struggles with fitting into peer groups while seeking 
out desirable social designations that distinguish themselves from the crowds with a unique 
social identity (e.g., “jocks”, “cool”, “populars”). In this regard, Brown and colleagues 
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(1994) note that adolescents tend to create socially construed mental representations of 
peer identities as “symbolic categories” that help them discern who is friend or foe in their 
local environments. If true, such mental representations about better or worse social 
categories that adolescents put themselves or others into might lead them to develop lay 
explanations about what gets them a better social designation. 
Connecting this with weight, a large volume of past studies has investigated the 
role of peer socialization processes in shaping adolescents’ weight-related cognitions and 
behaviors (Hutchinson & Rapee, 2007; Paxton et al., 1999; Rancourt et al., 2014; Webb & 
Zimmer-Gembeck, 2013). Most of these studies highlight peers’ weight-related social 
evaluation and sanction as important aspects of peer socialization processes that intensify 
the psychological salience of weight in adolescence. For instance, according to a meta-
analytic review (Webb & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2013), fat talk, weight teasing, peer pressure 
to be thin, peer encouragement to lose weight, weight bullying, and appearance 
conversations are the kinds of inputs that adolescents commonly receive from peer social 
environments. Given this, it is not surprising that typically developing adolescents become 
increasingly aware of weight as an important social proxy for desirable social places and 
peer acceptance.  
Taken together, it is our notion that adolescence is a sensitive developmental timing 
that accompanies pubertal transition and related neurobiological and socio-contextual 
changes. These biological and social contingencies might lead post-pubertal adolescents to 
actively construct or revise causal lay theories about weight and social status and apply 
them in various contexts of social information processing. Therefore, in the present study, 
we test our initial theoretical model with post-pubertal adolescents and young adults who 
might have formed coherent lay theories about weight causing social status.  
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THE PRESENT STUDY 
Building on the research summarized above, we conceptualize a developmental, 
mechanistic process model of the lay theories about weight and social status (see Figure 
1). For the purpose of the current study, we initially test whether adolescents’ and young 
adults’ mental representations about weight and social status might manifest in each step 
of the model: (1) probabilistic judgment (see step a in Figure 1), (2) social categorization 
(see step b in Figure 1), and (3) causal attribution (see step c in Figure 1). In doing so, we 
use novel social cognitive tasks that are thought to capture individuals’ cognitive 
tendencies to causally link weight and social status, which might be difficult to observe 
from self-report attitude measures.  
First, in probabilistic judgment scenarios (Part 1), we examine whether young 
individuals expect statistical covariation between a person’s weight and social status (step 
a in Figure 1). We use brief person statement scenarios about high school teenagers and 
test whether participants tend to make different probabilistic judgment about person’s 
social status on the basis of weight cues.   
Second, we developed a novel social categorization task (Part 2) to examine 
individuals’ tendencies to categorize people in terms of weight (step b in Figure 1). Using 
the logic of violation of expectation paradigms among adults (Plaks et al., 2005), it is 
hypothesized that when weight is considered to be a psychologically salient social cue, 
participants might rely more heavily on weight cues to categorize people and then link 
social status to these mentally represented weight categories. Such tendencies might be 
more pronounced when the available social information is incompatible with their held lay 
theories about weight and social status.  
Lastly, our study examines how adolescents might use their lay theories of weight 
and social status in causal attribution (Part 3). We expect that young individuals might have 
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tendencies to attend to weight as a potential cause of the negative outcome of social events 
as meaningful information (step c in Figure 1). When the causes of the events are 
ambiguous, such attributional tendencies might favor thin individuals over heavier 
individuals based on a lay explanation that being thin causes higher social status whereas 
being overweight causes lower social status. To test this, we manipulate actors’ perceived 
weight within individuals, and then measure overall tendencies of causal attribution as a 
function of target’s weight status.  
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METHODS 
PARTICIPANTS 
The present study includes two sample age groups: 9th grade adolescents (N=80) 
and college students (N=203). 9th grade adolescents were enrolled from a public high 
school in California and participated in a school field study during English or Health 
Education classes. Of 80 ninth grade students, 56.3% were girls (Mage= 14.6, SDage= 0.54). 
43.8% were European-American, 36.3% were Asian, 7.5% were Latino/Hispanic, 2.5% 
were African-American, 8.8% were multiracial or other ethnicity. According to self-
reported body mass index (BMI), 21.3% were underweight (BMI below 18.5), 63.8% were 
normal weight (BMI between 18.5 and 25), 11.3% were overweight (BMI between 25 and 
30), and 2.5% were obese (BMI greater than 30).  
In parallel with the school field research, a total of 206 college students were 
recruited from an undergraduate psychology research course in the University of Texas at 
Austin during Fall 2014-Spring 2015 academic year. College students participated in a 1-
hour laboratory study in an exchange of course credit. There were no exclusion criteria in 
terms of participants’ sex, ethnicity, school year, or body mass index. However, three 
participants who are age of 30s and 40s were screened out from the final analyses due to 
age range differences from typical college students sample. Of 203 students, sixty-one 
percent were college freshmen (Mage= 19.3, SDage= 0.95). Sixty-seven percent were women, 
47.6% were European- American, 21.8% were Asian, 19.9% were Hispanic/Latino, 4.4% 
were African-American, and 4.9% were multi-racial or other ethnicity. According to 
participants’ measured BMI of college students sample, 6.4% were underweight, 72.9% 
were normal weight, 13.3% were overweight, and 6.9% were medically obese. The 
research protocols were approved by the institutional research review board and a written 
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form of consents and assents were collected prior to the study. Only those who agreed to 
consent to the study were instructed to complete the study activities.  
PROCEDURE 
The study was conducted in laboratory and school classrooms for different age 
groups of participants. First, for 9th grade adolescents sample, we administered a school 
field study in English or Health Education classes during the Spring semester of 9th grade. 
Participants were invited to school computer labs for a single study session (approximately 
45 minutes). Cardboard dividers were set up between seats in order to protect students’ 
privacy as well as minimize disruption between adjacent peers. Following brief verbal 
instructions about the study purpose and procedures, students were asked to log in the 
online survey using their student ID and then complete the study materials privately at their 
own pace. Once participants completed the survey, they were redirected to computerized 
tasks that assess their social information processing tendencies in presence of weight and 
status cues. These computerized tasks were programmed and administered on the Inquisit 
Millisecond software (Milliseconds, 2003) which allows a highly precise recording of 
reaction time. In the beginning of each task, participants were presented with detailed task 
instructions and then asked to complete several practice trials. Those who did not consent 
to the study or chose to withdraw were instructed to work on their own homework or 
reading quietly.  
College student participants were invited to the laboratory for their individual study 
session. Following brief verbal instructions about study purpose and procedures, 
participants were brought to a small computer lab and then were asked to complete a self-
report online survey questionnaire privately at their own pace. Same as the school field 
study, a number of computerized social cognitive tasks followed with detailed instructions. 
Upon the completion of the computerized tasks, college student participants were led to 
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another room across the hallway for weight and height assessment. Weight and height 
measurements were privately done with a trained experimenter to prevent any 
psychological discomfort. After the completion of weight/height assessment, participants 
were thanked and offered a snack.  
Of importance, throughout the study, experimenters did not mention that the study 
was related to weight or social status as we expect that such explicit instructions can affect 
participants’ general response tendencies.  
MEASURES 
Weight-Social Status Probabilistic Judgment Scenarios 
To examine young individuals’ tendencies to use lay theories about weight and 
social status in probabilistic judgment, we used two vignettes for heavy vs. thin teenage 
girls. Using these vignettes, we measured participants’ overall tendencies to infer target 
person’s social status based on limited social information that includes weight cues (see 
Appendix A). First, a heavy target vignette reads: 
“Hanna is 15 years old, outgoing and very bright. She is somewhat taller than 
other girls, and she is somewhat heavy. She enjoys writing and is interested in 
news articles. As she works on the school announcements team, she often meets 
with other students in her school and interviews their stories.”  
After reading this vignette, participants were asked to estimate how likely or 
unlikely each of the statements could reflect Hannah’s personal characteristics using 
numeric values ranging between 0 (= extremely unlikely) and 100 (= extremely likely). 
Among six statements presented, we are primarily interested in probabilistic judgment 
made on three social status-relevant statements: “Hannah is very popular”; “Hannah 
doesn’t have a boyfriend”; and “Hannah is very popular and doesn’t have a boyfriend”.  
Similarly, in a thin target vignette, participants read a brief story as follows:  
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“Jennie is 16 years old, adventurous and very caring. She has average height in 
her age, and she is quite slim and skinny. She enjoys comedy movies and is 
interested in filming. As a member of the school movie club, she often goes out to 
watch movies with other club members, and posts reviews in her personal blog.”  
The order of heavy vs. thin target vignettes was randomized. Responses on the 
statement “Hanna/Jennie doesn’t have a boyfriend” were reversed, so that higher 
probability corresponds to higher social status inferred based on the given person 
descriptions. Greater differences in the estimated probability between thin and heavy 
targets indicate participants readily use their lay theories about weight and social status to 
make statistical inference about unfamiliar teenagers’ social status.  
Weight Social Categorization Task 
It is hypothesized that one’s lay theories about the relation of weight and social 
status might operate as mental representations and are used in categorizing people in terms 
of weight and social status dimensions. In particular, we expect that when individuals are 
presented with social cues deemed to be neutral and consistent with their mental 
representations (e.g., “an overweight person likes to go to concerts”), they might be less 
likely to use weight cues to categorize people. However, when individuals are confronted 
with social information that are inconsistent with their mental representations (e.g., “an 
overweight person is popular among peers”), it might induce a shift in the kind of strategies 
they use to categorize people. That is, they might resolve this cognitive conflict by relying 
more heavily on weight cues as meaningful social categories that convey some inherent 
traits about a person.  
To test this, we developed a novel social categorization task. The task design was 
informed by Diesendruck and haLevi (2006). In the task, participants were presented with 
three different person cards that describe a novel peer’s personal characteristics that are 
either social status-relevant (e.g., “Julie has many friends.”; “Ashley always got invited to 
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parties”) or neutral (e.g., “Daniel enjoys running.”, “Brittany loves animals”). In terms of 
weight cues, we systematically adapted body illustration images from a medical BMI chart 
to display a person figure for thin vs. heavy categories. Stimuli stature, body posture, 
appearance, and skin tone were held constant in order to minimize other confounding visual 
factors. See Appendix B.  
Using these person sorting card stimuli, participants were asked to make a 
spontaneous sorting judgment in terms of whether the target person in the center goes with 
either left or right card person. Importantly, the target person always shares a similar weight 
status with only one option card, whereas the personal character descriptor was matched to 
the remaining option card to create a choice conflict. The trial sequence and the position of 
left/right option cards were randomized. There are a total of 16 actual trials that are broken 
by target’s weight status (heavy/thin), statement (popularity/neutral), and gender 
(female/male). 4 neutral control trials were added to match in terms of t-shirt colors 
(green/purple) as alternative visual cues that are non-weight yet perceptually salient. A 
number of practice trials with neutral visual and written cues were given prior to the actual 
trials. 
Responses were recorded and analyzed in terms of the % of weight cue sorting in 
different trial conditions and corresponding average latency of sorting in milliseconds. We 
hypothesized that young individuals on average might refrain from using weight cues to 
categorize people in neutral statement condition, in which other person statements rather 
than weight cues share a common attribute to form a group (e.g., “Robert loves animals” 
and “Aaron has cats and dogs”). However, in popularity statement condition, individuals’ 
held lay theories about weight and social status are challenged with incompatible 
information (e.g., a heavy looking person has many friends), and thus induce a shift in 
social categorization strategies, indicated by increased use of weight cues in social 
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categorization. In terms of reaction time, it is expected that people’s mental processing 
time (ms) would take longer in heavy target-popularity statement trials, as they resolve 
cognitive conflict between weight and social status cues.  
As in many other cognitive tasks, we found that raw latency was significantly 
skewed, a Shapiro-Wilk normality test W=.599, p=.000. Therefore, we trimmed extreme 
values (greater than 2SD, or below 100ms), and then transformed the trimmed values with 
square root. This improved the normality issues of the latency variable, a Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test W=.975, p=.000. See Appendix X for visual examination of latency variable 
distribution. See appendix for visual examination of the latency distribution. 
Weight Attribution Task 
In contexts of weight and social status, it is our notion that post-pubertal adolescents 
might have already formed coherent lay theories and use them when interpreting the causes 
of social events. For instance, when a teenager witness ambiguous social rejection from 
their peers, he or she might attribute that to person’s inherent characteristics (e.g., “S/He 
must be not likable”) or some other situational factors that are not fully known. One way 
to test this hypothesis is to manipulate targets’ perceived weight status and then measure 
how young individuals attribute causally ambiguous yet negative events to either person 
traits (dispositional attribution) or situation (external attribution) depending on the target’s 
perceived weight. We adapted an ambiguous social cue task (Flagan & Beer, in prep) that 
assesses individuals’ attributional judgment in various causally ambiguous social contexts.  
The present task consists of four phases: attention fixation (2 seconds), target 
weight manipulation (3 seconds), ambiguous scenario (3 seconds), and attribution probe 
question (6 seconds). To manipulate actor’s perceived weight and attractiveness, we first 
selected twenty stock photo images of teenage girls and young female adults with varying 
degrees of attractiveness, weight, and ethnicity. To create two distinctive weight status 
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categories (heavy vs. thin) within same target stimuli, we retouched these images using 
Photoshop software. Mechanical Turk online survey respondents (N=55, 64.3% female, 
Mage= 26.3) rated these retouched images in terms of perceived weight status, 
attractiveness, popularity, and age. Based on the average rating scores, we selected 6 highly 
attractive female images (Mattractiveness =5.81) that are manipulated to be heavy (Mweight =5.50) 
or thin (Mweight =3.81) in terms of weight, and other 6 female images with average 
attractiveness (Mattractiveness = 4.33) that are manipulated to be heavy (Mweight =5.43) or thin 
(Mweight =3.82). See Appendix D for weight manipulation stimuli. 
There were a total of 12 attribution judgment scenarios in contexts of peers, 
romantic relationships, and public social interactions. For instance, a romantic relationship 
scenario reads: 
“Haley texts her crush to ask if he wants to go out for a movie this evening. She 
sees that he read the message but did not reply yet.” 
These scenarios were randomly paired with female target stimuli—heavy/highly 
attractive, heavy/average attractive, thin/highly attractive, thin/average attractive targets. 
Participants were instructed to make a spontaneous attribution judgment with regard to 
whether the cause of the ambiguously negative social event is due to the person (e.g., 
“doesn’t want to go”) or the situation (e.g., “no time to reply”) by pressing “F” (left) or “J” 
(right) keys using the keyboards. Across all trials, four levels of randomization were 
implemented: (1) individual trial sequence; (2) heavy vs. thin target image selection within 
same targets; (3) scenario assignment to individual targets; and (4) the left/right position 
of response options. See Appendix E.  
Responses were recorded in terms of the direction of attribution (person vs. 
situation blame) and corresponding reaction time (ms). The average score of attribution in 
each trial block was computed so that 1= all situation/non-dispositional attribution and -1= 
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all person traits/dispositional attribution. We expected that if young individuals hold lay 
theories about weight and social status, their attributional tendencies might be affected as 
a function of targets’ perceived weight status. Therefore, we contrasted attribution scores 
between thin and heavy target trials. Greater differences in composite scores indicate more 
negative, dispositional (person traits) attribution toward heavy young women relative to 
slender young women. 
Body Mass Index 
We assessed participants’ weight and height in the laboratory study in order to 
understand sample characteristics with respect to body mass index. Prior to measurement, 
participants were asked to take off shoes and heavy outers for measurement precision. First, 
in weight assessment, participants were given a box to hold and then stand on a digital 
weight scale to obscure their measured weight (Logel & Cohen, 2012). To compute 
participant’s actual weight in kg, box weight (5kg) was subtracted from the measured 
weight in kg. Next, for height assessment, participants were instructed to stand against a 
stature scale. Measurement was recorded in cm. For school field study with high school 
adolescents, we used self-reported weight and height to compute BMI and corresponding 
BMI categories. 
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines 
(Kuczmarski et al., 2002), a simple formula for BMI is weight (kg) divided by squared 
height (m). Using this formula, we computed individual participants’ BMI using a 
measured weight (kg) and height (m). The measured BMI was further classified into four 
BMI status categories: underweight (BMI under 18.5), normal (BMI between 18.5 and 25), 
overweight (BMI between 25 and 30), and obese (BMI greater than 30).  
We do not hold predictions that only young individuals with certain weight range 
would develop causal lay theories about weight and social status. Rather, we view that the 
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formation of causal lay theories about weight and social status might be somewhat 
universal. Consistent with this, participants’ BMI did not significantly predict their 
responses on the social cognitive task, Ps > .10. Therefore, in the analysis we do not include 
BMI as a statistical covariate.  
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RESULTS 
In the present study, we conducted data analysis with SPSS ver. 23 for Mac 
software. As our primary focus of analysis was to test the mean differences of participants’ 
responses between overweight and thin stimuli conditions, we mainly used a series of 
pairwise t-tests to contrast the mean levels between heavy vs. thin stimuli trials according 
to our hypotheses. In pairwise t-tests, we did not control for the mean differences 
attributable to participants’ own gender and BMI as pairwise t-tests do not permit statistical 
covariates. When age differences appeared to emerge between the adolescents and college 
samples, we conducted a repeated measures of ANOVA by entering AGE (adolescents vs. 
college sample) as a between subject grouping factor and treating responses on the tasks as 
repeated measures within subjects.  
PART 1: WEIGHT-SOCIAL STATUS PROBABILISTIC JUDGMENT  
We examined whether high school adolescents and young adults on average tend 
to pick up on statistical associations between one’s weight and social status and use them 
to infer teenage girls’ social status differentially based on weight cues. Specifically, we 
contrasted the differences in the average % of the target being estimated to be popular in 
heavy vs. thin target scenarios. The ratings for the item “she doesn’t have a boyfriend” 
were reversed so that higher values indicate a higher social status. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, pairwise t-tests indicated that both 9th grade adolescents and college adults on 
average tend to say that thin female targets are more likely to be very popular (Mthin=  
57.38%, SDthin=23.01, Mheavy=44.84%, SDheavy=23.75,  t(79)=5.10, p=.000 for adolescents; 
Mthin=56.18%, SDthin=19.03, Mheavy=48.19%, SDheavy=21.75,  t(201)=4.60, p=.000 for 
college adults), and more likely to have a romantic partner (Mthin=70.62%, SDthin=20.47, 
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Mheavy=54.19%, SDheavy=25.68, t(76)=4.86, p=.000 for adolescents; Mthin=64.56%, SDthin= 
20.95, Mheavy= 49.63%, SDheavy=18.61, t(201)= 7.51, p=.000 for college).  
Interestingly, the mean level differences between heavy and thin target scenarios 
were greater when the statement was somewhat mixed in terms of social status—“she is 
very popular and doesn’t have a boyfriend”, Mthin=76.13%, SDthin=22.12, Mheavy= 36.09%, 
SDheavy= 22.20,  t(79)=12.96, p=.000 for adolescents; Mthin=73.62%, SDthin=20.93, Mheavy= 
45.00%, SDheavy=20.90,  t(201)=12.96, p=.000 for college adults. Further, there appeared 
no significant gender differences across all responses, Ps > .10, suggesting that the 
tendencies to recall the statistical associations between weight and social status might not 
differ across gender groups. See Figure 2.  
PART 2: WEIGHT SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION 
Though probabilistic judgment tendencies shown in Part 1 provide some initial 
evidence that both adolescents and young adults readily reference weight cues and form 
impression about others with regard to social status, the measures did not fully control for 
other social information that might be equally important in social evaluation process. 
Moreover, it remains unclear how participants reconcile multiple social cues that may or 
may not be consistent with their lay theories about weight and social status. To address this 
question, we used a novel social categorization task that pairs visual weight cues with social 
status statements and then systematically dissect how participants engage in social 
categorization with cues that are inconsistent with lay theories. In doing so, we 
hypothesized that participants would suppress their overall tendencies to use weight cues 
in categorizing people. However, such cognitive styles might be challenged in popularity 
statement trials in which an overweight person is classified into a “popular” category with 
a skinny person. To test this hypothesis, we first looked at the average % of weight cue 
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social categorization in heavy/popular, heavy/neutral, thin/popular, thin/neutral, t-shirt 
color/neutral statement trials.  
Weight social categorization tendencies 
As expected, we found a significant difference in the average % of weight cue 
sorting between popularity statement trials (e.g., “always gets invited to parties”, “has 
many friends”, “is the captain of football team”) and neutral statement trials. That is, when 
the visual weight cue-based matching was conflicting with popularity cue-based matching, 
participants were more likely to use weight cues to categorize people into a same group 
compared to neutral statement trials, Mpop=0.22, SDpop=0.23, Mneu=0.10, SDneu=0.19, 
t(73)=6.945, p=.000 for adolescents; Mpop= 0.27, SDpop=0.19, Mneu=0.07, SDneu=0.15, 
t(201)=16.69, p=.000 for college adults. Further, we tested the effect of target weight status 
(heavy vs. thin) on the % of weight-based social categorization. In both adolescents and 
college adults sample, participants were slightly more likely to categorize people in terms 
of weight cues rather than popularity cues when the target was thin than the target was 
heavy, Mheavy-pop= 0.19, SDheavy-pop= 0.23, Mthin-pop= 0.26, SDthin-pop= 0.30, t(73)= –2.16, p=.034 
for adolescents; Mheavy-pop= 0.24, SDheavy-pop= 0.18, Mthin-pop= 0.31, SDthin-pop= 0.27, t(201)= –
3.43, p=.001 for college adults. However, it is important to note that the average % sorting 
in terms of weight cues in popularity statement trials was significant lower than the chance 
level, t(73)= 10.50, p=.000 for adolescents; t(201)= 16.66, p=.000 for college sample, 
suggesting that a tendency to suppress weight-based social categorization. See Figure 3.  
Target gender effects in weight social categorization 
Are individuals’ lay theories about weight and social status more potent toward 
women than men? To test this, we compared female vs. male target cards trials. Results 
indicated significant target gender differences in heavy target-popularity statement trials, 
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M=0.26, SD=0.31 for female/heavy target-popularity statement trials, M=0.11, SD=0.24 
for male/heavy target-popularity statement trials, t(73)=4.49, p=.000 for adolescents 
sample; M=0.38, SD= 0.27 for female/heavy target-popularity statement trials, M=0.11, 
SD=0.22 for male/heavy target-popularity statement trials, t(201)=11.83, p=.000 for 
college sample. In thin target-popularity statement trials, target gender differences were 
found only in college sample, t(73)=0.00, p=1.00 for adolescents sample; t(201)=2.401, 
p=.017 for college sample. The target gender effects in social categorization tendencies 
implicate that young individuals are more prone to use their lay theories about weight and 
social status toward overweight females than overweight males. See Figure 4.  
Latencies in weight social categorization 
We hypothesized that weight cues-popularity statement trials would violate 
individuals’ held lay theories about weight and social status, therefore average sorting 
judgment time would take longer in popularity statement trials than neutral statement trials, 
indicated by greater values in latency (ms, square root transformed). Supporting this 
hypothesis, results showed that both adolescents and college samples exhibit slower 
latencies in popularity statement trials than neutral trials, Mpop=64.93, SDpop=10.68, 
Mneu=59.91, SDneu=10.16, t(73)=5.98, p=.000 for adolescents; Mpop=63.01, SDpop=9.08, 
Mneu=55.71, SDneu= 8.53, t(201)=17.76, p=.000 for college adults. In terms of target weight 
status (heavy vs. thin) effects in sorting latency, we found significantly slower latencies in 
popularity statement trials compared to neutral trials for both heavy and thin target trials, 
Ps=.000. Also, participants were significantly slower in weight status (heavy vs. thin) trials 
compared to neutral control trials with t-shirt color cues (green vs. purple), Ps=.000. This 
rules out the possibility that any visual cues that are conflicting with statements might 
induce longer processing time. See Figure 5. 
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PART 3: WEIGHT ATTRIBUTION 
 In spite of findings in Part 1 and 2 that are consistent with our prediction, one might 
contend that probabilistic judgment and social categorization could possibly operate under 
a pure mental association between one’s weight status and social status that are not 
necessarily a causal relationship per se. In other words, it is possible to argue that young 
individuals do not hold a particular causal lay theories about how different weight status 
causes different social status, rather they are simply aware of statistical associations 
between two meaningful social dimensions. Therefore, it is important to manipulate target 
person’s perceived weight status and then assess how participants use their mental 
representations to come up with different causal explanations for ambiguous social events 
depending on targets’ perceived weight. In this regard, past studies have shown that 
overweight women are vulnerable to make self-blame attribution in the face of negative 
social feedback and this self-blaming attribution elicits negative affects and lower self 
esteem (Crocker et al., 1993; Major et al., 2012). However, to our knowledge no prior 
studies have investigated whether and to what extent a third person’s perceived weight 
status produces different causal explanations for ambiguously negative social events. In 
light of this, in Part 3, we tested whether adolescents’ and young adults’ lay theories about 
weight and social status engender more negative dispositional (person traits) vs. situational 
causal explanations for heavy vs. thin female targets.  
The aggregated attribution composite scores in the weight attribution task ranged 
between  -1 (= all person traits/dispositional attribution) and 1 (= all situation/non-
dispositional attribution). Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine age 
differences between adolescents and college sample in causal attribution as a function of 
targets’ perceived weight status (heavy vs. thin). In terms of model specification of the 
repeated measures of ANOVA, we entered participants’ attribution scores on heavy vs. 
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thin target trials as within subjects repeated measures, and then included AGE (adolescents 
vs. college) as a between subjects group factor. No statistical covariates—such as gender 
or BMI—were entered as they appeared non-significant. 
Results indicated a significant interaction of AGE x Target Weight, F(1, 
278)=6.749, p=.01. To further determine the direction of interaction, pairwise t-tests were 
conducted within age group. In adolescent sample, causal attribution tendencies did not 
significantly differ between heavy and thin target trials, Mheavy=.19, SDheavy=.49, Mthin= .17, 
SDthin=.39, t(74)=0.293, p=.77. In contrast, college adults were more likely to attribute 
ambiguously negative events to negative, dispositional (person traits) reasons for heavy 
target relative to thin target trials, Mheavy= .11, SDheavy= .42, Mthin= .09, SDthin= .39, t(201)= 
5.098, p=.000. We did not find significant 3 way interaction of AGE x GENDER x Target 
Weight, F(1, 276)=0.56, p=.455. See Figure 6. 
Next, we examined whether adolescents’ and young adults’ lay theories about 
weight and social status are selectively applied to different social contexts: peers, romantic, 
and public social interactions. In the adolescent sample, we did not find any significant 
differences in attributional tendencies between thin vs. heavy target across peer, romantic, 
and public contexts, Ps > .20. However, college adults exhibit significant mean level 
differences in all three types of social context scenarios, and the mean differences between 
heavy and thin target conditions were the greatest in romantic contexts (mean difference 
between heavy vs. thin targets in peer contexts=.163, t(201)=2.252, p=.025; mean 
difference in romantic relationship contexts=.282, t(201)=4.299, p=.000; mean difference 
in public interaction scenarios=.139, t(201)=2.081, p=.039). Taken together, our 
hypothesis in weight causal attribution task was only supported in college adults sample. 
See Figure 7.   
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DISCUSSION 
Despite heightened societal and public awareness of population level obesity rates 
and its psychological implications in contemporary life, surprisingly little developmental 
research has been conducted in an effort to understand the development of one’s lay 
theories about weight or the potential link between weight and social status. This gap in 
the literature might be in part because of our common view that weight is not a 
psychological trait, but rather a biological entity that does not load with psychological 
meanings. As a consequence, existing literatures primarily focus on investigating “weight” 
through the lens of stigma and stereotypes against overweight individuals (Crocker et al., 
1993; Major et al., 2012; Puhl & Heuer, 2009), or body/weight dissatisfaction and clinical 
eating disorders (Stice & Bearman, 2001; Stice & Shaw, 2002; Stice, Mazotti, Weibel, & 
Agras, 2000). Unfortunately, this relatively independent theoretical and empirical pursuit 
in existing literatures on weight did not provide a substantial explanation on how 
individuals’ understanding of the psychological concept of weight develop and change over 
time as a fundamental developmental inquiry. Further, little is known in terms of why 
adolescents and young adults who are in a healthy weight range are chronically concerned 
with their weight and pursue extreme weight loss behavior.  
In light of this, the present research attempts to conceptualize the development of 
causal lay theories about weight and social status. As an initial test, we examine post-
pubertal adolescents and young adults who might have already formed coherent causal lay 
theories that concern the relation between weight and social status. Drawing on 
Developmental Intergroup Theory (DIT; Bigler & Liben, 2006; 2007), we posit that 
perceptual discriminability of weight cues are likely to induce the psychological salience 
of this person attribute among other social dimensions, which might lead to engender 
individuals’ cognitive tendencies to use this salient person attribute to categorize people 
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and attach meanings toward individuals who share similar characteristics in weight. 
Further, our central thesis is that adolescents and adults might come to establish causal lay 
theories in an attempt to explain the relation between weight and social status, and use that 
to make sense of the world and guide their actions. To demonstrate whether and how young 
individuals use their lay theories about weight and social status in judgment of others, our 
study examines probabilistic judgment (Part 1), social categorization (Part 2), and causal 
attribution tendencies (Part 3) in the presence of weight and social status cues.  
In probabilistic judgment scenarios (Part 1), findings support our predictions that 
both adolescents and young adults are able to detect statistical covariation between weight 
and social status and use this statistical covariation to make probabilistic inference about 
others’ social status. This tendency was expressed in overestimating one’s social status 
when the person is described as skinny, while underestimating one’s social status when the 
person is illustrated as heavy. It is important to note that this measure was completed in the 
beginning of the self report survey, before participants are exposed to any written or visual 
weight cues in other measures. This implicates that post-pubertal adolescents are able to 
quickly form impressions about others’ social status based on their mental representations 
about weight and social status and its statistical covariation in the real world. This is 
consistent with the inherence heuristic (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) and essentialism 
literatures (Gelman, 2003; Gelman, 2004; Gelman et al., 2007; Heyman & Gelman, 2000) 
which showed individuals’ cognitive tendencies to quickly search for inherent features of 
an entity and use that to infer novel information about the entity.  
Next, in social categorization task (Part 2), our findings reveal interesting 
tendencies that both adolescents and college adults are more likely to rely on weight cues 
in judgment of others’ social status and use that to categorize people. However, when other 
competing cues were irrelevant to social status, participants shifted their sorting strategies, 
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so that they now group people based on shared characteristics (e.g., interest), rather than 
visibly similar weight cues. This supports our prediction that individuals’ lay theories about 
weight and social status (“weight causes certain social status”) would elicit cognitive 
conflict when presented with sorting cards that are incompatible with their held theories 
(e.g., “overweight person is popular/has many friends”). Under this popularity statement 
condition, to categorize people in terms of written statements would violate their 
understanding of the world (e.g., the skinny and the overweight go into the same popular 
social group), therefore they are likely to turn to weight cues to assign a mental 
categorization. In line with this, our findings in sorting latency differences also support this 
notion that participants might have felt more of a processing load in weight-popularity 
trials relative to weight-neutral statement trials. 
This social categorization tendency in weight-social status (Part 2) has a number of 
important implications. First, according to the DIT (Bigler & Liben, 2006; 2007) and 
intergroup attitude literatures (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Ambady, Sommers, & Norton, 2008) 
with regard to race, individuals’ tendencies to explicitly reference racial groups are 
suppressed by the age of 8-9. Specifically, Apfelbaum and colleagues (2008) have shown 
that school children compared to preschoolers begin to understand societal norms and 
existing prejudices against racial minority groups and therefore refrain from explicitly 
using group-relevant social cues (e.g., “Is s/he black?”) even in a novel social game context. 
Similar to this, our study found that adolescents and college adults on average exhibited an 
overall tendency to suppress their use of weight cues. This was indicated by below chance 
level weight-based social categorization across different trials. To further understand the 
extent to which young individuals view weight-based social categorization as a benign or 
prejudiced form of social cognition, it would be interesting to ask participants to provide 
their answers to experimenters and then look at how this explicit reporting context might 
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affect the frequencies of using weight cues in social categorization, compared to the 
experimental contexts where participants privately complete the task.  
Second, our findings in overall sorting tendencies suggest that adolescents and 
adults do not merely attend to perceptually discriminating cues (e.g., heavy vs. thin body 
figures, or t-shirt color) that are visually more salient than written statements. Rather, they 
view this through the lens of their mental representations about the social world and 
selectively choose between salient and less salient cues to make social categorization. 
Indeed, this is consistent with the core thesis of social cognitive development framework 
(Olson & Dweck, 2008) that highlights the role of individuals’ mental representations in 
shaping one’s attention and interpretation of social information and as a result creating 
coherent meaning systems. 
Third, it is important to note that these social cognitive tendencies in weight-based 
social categorization were more pronounced toward overweight female targets compared 
to their male counterparts. Unlike other tasks and measures, in this minimal set of social 
categorization task, we show that individuals’ lay theories about weight and social status 
might differ between men and women. This further seems to reflect stronger psychological 
links between weight and social status toward women than men in our society. In future 
studies, it would be interesting to test how the measured weight social categorization 
tendencies predict moral licensing of weight discrimination and stereotypes against 
overweight females more so than their male counterparts, and how these in turn might be 
detected by women as a potential source of weight concerns and dissatisfaction. 
Finally, in Part 3, we conducted more controlled, causal test of the effects of weight 
in forming different causal explanations on ambiguous social events. Our prediction was 
that if young individuals hold lay theories that being skinny causes high social status or 
being overweight causes lower status, they might come to believe that the reasons for why 
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a person receives negative social feedback differ depending on their weight—that is, more 
negative dispositional, person trait attribution for overweight individuals, whereas more 
situational/non-dispositional blames for slender individuals. We found mixed evidence in 
the causal attribution task between different age groups. That is, college adults exhibit 
significantly more negative, dispositional (person traits) causal attribution toward 
overweight target females in comparison to thin target females across all types of social 
contexts. However, among the adolescent sample, we did not find supporting evidence in 
weight-based causal attribution tendencies.  
There might be at least two reasons for this. First, it is possible that adolescents on 
average might not have fully formed coherent lay theories about weight and social status 
to make differential causal claims based on target’s perceived weight. That is, they might 
be able to detect statistical covariation between different weight status and social status 
from their environments, but do not necessarily hold strong causal views to believe that 
weight causes social status. As an alternative explanation, we speculate that adolescent 
participants might have paid more attention to other cues of the target person stimuli and 
steered their causal attribution based on their observations. As such example, we found a 
significant difference of causal attribution as a function of target’ attractiveness (high vs. 
average attractiveness). To disentangle this, future studies are needed with more diverse, 
large sample of adolescents and with more visible contrast between heavy and thin weight 
status manipulation.  
LIMITATIONS 
There are a number of limitations in the present research that are important to 
consider for future investigation. First, the present research does not include a direct test of 
specific contents of lay theories of weight and social status. That is, our theoretical 
predictions do not differentiate between the lay beliefs that “being overweight causes lower 
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status” and that “being thin causes higher status”. Here, we simply showed that young 
individuals tend to hold lay theories that “weight causes certain social status”. Therefore, 
it is possible that one’s lay theories about weight and social status could be multiple forms 
rather than being one particular content. However, operating under these global lay theories 
about weight and social status, the present study demonstrated that adolescents and young 
adults do hold mental representations about the relationship between one’s weight and 
social status, and tend to apply these lay beliefs in various types of social information 
processing contexts.   
Second, although we are deeply interested in the question of when these lay theories 
about weight and social status first emerge, and how these lay theories might unfold with 
development, our study does not directly speak to these important developmental 
questions. Nevertheless, we posit that pubertal transition might serve as a sensitive time 
period that brings several important neurobiological and psychological changes. Further, 
these pubertal transition-associated psychobiological changes might affect objective 
weight status and physical growth as well as psychological concept around one’s weight 
and social status (Forbes & Dahl, 2010; Ge et al., 2001; Markey, 2010; Tremblay & 
Lariviere, 2009). Supporting this conjecture, using representative sample data, Ge and co-
authors (2001) have shown that girls’ significant weight gain during the pubertal transition 
is linked to subjective overweight perception. Therefore, in the future study, it would be 
important to assess adolescents’ lay theories about weight and social status by comparing 
pre- and post-pubertal age groups to determine developmental processes.  
Last, the tasks and measures used in the present research mostly focus on female 
targets (Part 1 and Part 3). Thus, the current study does not completely eliminate the 
possibility that the gendered stimuli (e.g., only showing female scenarios or images) in the 
task might affect the ways in which individuals interpret the meaning of social cues. 
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Although most of the existing literatures on weight and weight-related social cognitions 
disproportionately focus on girls and young women as a high risk group for weight 
bias/stigma, subjective weight concerns, and clinical eating disorders, it would be more fair 
tests of the current hypotheses if the tasks included both genders in equal manner. Given 
this, future studies would greatly benefit from utilizing stimuli for both gender and 
assessing whether individuals’ lay theories about weight and social status are relevant to 
both female and male targets. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Adolescents often receive explicit and implicit messages from peers, romantic 
partners, popular media, and societies that admire skinny girls and lean body as a 
meaningful social accomplishment that attracts positive feedback and social reward (Webb 
& Zimmer-Gembeck, 2013 for meta analytic review). Meanwhile, children and adolescents 
often witness overweight peers in schools and playgrounds who become constant targets 
of bullying and social rejection from peer groups. All these social inputs and daily 
observations from focal environments might continuously influence the ways in which 
individuals form causal mental representations about who gets popular and who gets not in 
terms of weight dimension. Building on to this hypothesis, the present research takes an 
initial step to show that one’s mental representations about weight and social status are 
readily applied in individuals’ social information processing and these tendencies can be 
measured in several domains of social cognitions: probabilistic judgment, social 
categorization, and causal attribution.  
Though the present study mainly focused on demonstrating the existence of lay 
theories about weight and social status, it is crucial to extend our theoretical inquiries to 
developmental antecedents and outcomes of these lay theories (see Olson & Dweck, 2008). 
First, developmental antecedents concern the question of where these lay theories come 
from. There might be multiple sources of person- and societal-level factors that contribute 
to crystalize or alter one’s lay beliefs about weight and social status. Parenting, media, 
cultures, peer norms, and individual differences of sensitivity to social status might be a 
few that are thought to intervene these processes. Identifying critical developmental 
antecedents and individual difference factors would be an important step toward 
understanding the architecture of these lay theories with regard to weight and social status.  
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Finally, like in many other prominent social cognitive developmental theories 
(Bigler & Liben, 2006; 2007; Dodge et al., 2015; Yeager & Dweck, 2012; Yeager et al., 
2011; 2013), one’s mental representations about social world are thought to shape 
behaviors that are relevant to the domain of the lay theories. In this regard, one might posit 
that one’s lay theories about weight and social status might predict one’s behavioral 
tendencies to control weight in an attempt to enhance one’s social designation in a valued 
group. Therefore, it is our hope that future studies might continue to investigate 
developmental antecedents and outcomes of lay theories of weight and social status in an 
effort to better understand the implication of these lay beliefs.    
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Developmental mechanistic process model of lay theories about weight and 
social status. 
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Figure 2. Weight-social status probabilistic judgment in heavy vs. thin target vignettes, 
broken by age group (Adolescents, N=80; College adults, N=203).  
Notes: The statement “has a boyfriend” is a reversed probability score on the original 
statement “Hannah/Jennie has no boyfriend”. Greater values on y-axis indicate higher 
social status estimated for the target person. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard errors. *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p <.05, + p < .10. 
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Figure 3. Overall tendencies in sorting novel peers in terms of weight cues in a social 
categorization task, broken by age group (Adolescents, N=74; College 
adults, N=203).  
Notes: Error bars indicate ± 1 standard errors. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <.05, + p < 
.10. 
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Figure 4. Target gender effects in overall sorting tendencies in terms of weight cues, 
broken by age group (Adolescents, N=74; College adults, N=203).  
Notes: Error bars indicate ± 1 standard errors. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <.05, + p < 
.10.  
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Figure 5. Average latencies in a weight social categorization task, broken by age group 
(Adolescents, N=74; College adults, N=203).  
Notes: Error bars indicate ± 1 standard errors. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <.05, + p < 
.10. 
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Figure 6. Effects of target weight and attractiveness in causal attribution, broken by age 
group (Adolescents, N=75; College adults, N=203).  
Notes: Error bars indicate ± 1 standard errors. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <.05, + p < 
.10. 
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Figure 7. Social context effects in weight attribution (Adolescents, N=75; College adults, 
N=203). 
Notes: Error bars indicate ± 1 standard errors. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p <.05, + p < 
.10 
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APPENDIX A.  
MEASURE OF WEIGHT-SOCIAL STATUS PROBABILISTIC JUDGMENT 
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In the following questions, you will read a brief story about a person and then asked to 
make guesses about how likely or unlikely each of the statements describe the person. 
 
Please imagine the person in the story, and then answer the question in the following 
section. 
 
“Hanna is 15 years old, outgoing and very bright. She is somewhat taller than 
other girls, and she is somewhat heavy. She enjoys writing and is interested in 
news articles. As she works on the school announcements team, she often meets 
with other students in her school and interviews their stories.”  
 
 
For each of the statements below, how likely or unlikely it is that the description could 
reflect Hannah’s characteristics? Please indicate your opinions in the slide bar between 0 
and 100. Drag the bar around to adjust the number.  
 
0 = Extremely Unlikely ~ 100 = Extremely Likely 
 
 
  
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Hannah enjoys workout 
and goes to the gym 
every morning.
Hannah is very popular.
Hannah wants to become 
a journalist.
Hannah doesn’t have 
a boyfriend.
Hannah volunteers at 
a local hospital.
Hannah is very popular 
and doesn’t have 
a boyfriend.
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In the following questions, you will read a brief story about a person and then asked to 
make guesses about how likely or unlikely each of the statements describe the person. 
 
Please imagine the person in the story, and then answer the question in the following 
section. 
 
“Jennie is 16 years old, adventurous and very caring. She has average height in 
her age, and she is quite slim and skinny. She enjoys comedy movies and is 
interested in filming. As a member of the school movie club, she often goes out to 
watch movies with other club members, and posts reviews in her personal blog.” 
 
 
For each of the statements below, how likely or unlikely it is that the description could 
reflect Jennie’s characteristics? Please indicate your opinions in the slide bar between 0 
and 100. Drag the bar around to adjust the number.  
 
0 = Extremely Unlikely ~ 100 = Extremely Likely 
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Jennie enjoys workout 
and runs every morning.
Jennie is very popular.
Jennie wants to become 
a movie director.
Jennie doesn’t have 
a boyfriend.
Jennie volunteers at 
a local library.
Jennie is very popular 
and doesn’t have 
a boyfriend.
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[Intro] 
 
 
[Instructions] 
 
 
[Transition] 
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[Practice #1] 
 
 
[Practice #2] 
 
 
[Instructions] 
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[1. 
Thin−Popular−Female
] 
 
 
[2. 
Thin−Popular−Female
] 
 
 
[3. 
Thin−Popular−Male] 
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[4. 
Thin−Popular−Male] 
 
 
[5. 
Heavy−Popular−Fema
le] 
 
 
[6. 
Heavy−Popular−Fema
le] 
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[7. 
Heavy−Popular−Male
] 
 
 
[8. 
Heavy−Popular−Male
] 
 
 
[9. 
Thin−Neutral−Female
] 
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[10. 
Thin−Neutral−Female
] 
 
 
[11. 
Thin−Neutral−Male] 
 
 
[12. 
Thin−Neutral−Male] 
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[13. 
Heavy−Neutral−Fema
le] 
 
 
[14. 
Heavy−Neutral−Fema
le] 
 
 
[15. 
Heavy−Neutral−Male] 
 
 58 
[16. 
Heavy−Neutral−Male] 
 
 
[17. 
Color−Neutral−Femal
e] 
 
 
[18. 
Color−Neutral−Femal
e] 
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[19.  
Color−Neutral−Male] 
 
 
[20.  
Color−Neutral−Male] 
 
 
[Ending instructions] 
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STIMULI OF ACTOR WEIGHT MANIPULATION IN WEIGHT ATTRIBUTION TASK 
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[Actor Stimuli Rating Questionnaire] 
 
[Perceived Weight] Very 
Underweight 
Somewhat 
Underweight 
Slightly 
Underweight 
Normal 
Weight 
Slightly 
Overweight 
Somewhat 
Overweight 
Very 
Overweight 
Q. How much do you 
think this person weighs? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
[Perceived Attractiveness] Very 
Unattractive 
Somewhat 
Unattractive 
Slightly 
Unattractive 
Neutral/ 
Undecided 
Slightly 
Attractive 
Somewhat 
Attractive 
Very 
Attractive 
Q. To what degree do you 
think this person is 
attractive 
or unattractive? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
[Perceived Popularity] Very 
Unpopular 
Somewhat 
Unpopular 
Slightly 
Unpopular 
Neutral/ 
Undecided 
Slightly 
Popular 
Somewhat 
Popular 
Very 
Popular 
Q. How likely do you 
think this person would be 
popular in high school? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
[Perceived Age] 
Q. How old do you think this person would be?  Please enter the estimated age of this person with a number. 
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[Thin-Highly Attractive Actors] 
 
Stimuli 
      
#No. Thin-Att.01 Thin-Att.02 Thin-Att.03 Thin-Att.04 Thin-Att.05 Thin-Att.06 
Mean  
Weight 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.4 3.8 4.1 
Mean 
Attractiveness 5.9 5.2 5.9 5.8 5.6 6.0 
Mean 
Popularity 5.9 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.1 
Mean 
Age 18.7 17.8 19.5 18.4 20.8 19.3 
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[Heavy-Highly Attractive Actors] 
 
Stimuli 
      
#No. Heavy-Att.01 Heavy-Att.02 Heavy-Att.03 Heavy-Att.04 Heavy-Att.05 Heavy-Att.06 
Mean 
Weight 5.7 5.1 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.4 
Mean 
Attractiveness 4.5 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.4 5.1 
Mean 
Popularity 4.6 4.4 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.1 
Mean 
Age 19.7 20.1 21.1 19.9 22.7 19.2 
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[Thin-Average Attractive Actors] 
 
Stimuli 
      
#No. Thin-Unatt.07 Thin-Unatt.08 Thin-Unatt.09 Thin-Unatt.10 Thin-Unatt.11 Thin-Unatt.12 
Mean 
Weight 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.8 
Mean 
Attractiveness 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.8 4.6 4.2 
Mean 
Popularity 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.7 
Mean 
Age 17.1 17.6 19.4 14.7 19.6 17.7 
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[Heavy-Average Attractive Actors] 
 
Stimuli 
      
#No. Heavy-Unatt.07 Heavy -Unatt.08 Heavy -Unatt.09 Heavy -Unatt.10 Heavy -Unatt.11 Heavy -Unatt.12 
Mean 
Weight 5.7 5.2 6.1 5.1 5.4 5.1 
Mean 
Attractiveness 3.4 3.5 3.0 4.1 4.4 3.8 
Mean 
Popularity 3.6 3.2 3.1 3.9 4.3 4.1 
Mean 
Age 18.1 17.7 20.7 15.9 20.8 18.1 
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[Intro] 
 
 
[Keyboard input instructions] 
 
 
[Task Instructions] 
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[Practice #1] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[Practice #1] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[Practice #1] 
 
Probe question 
 
 
 69 
[Practice #2] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[Practice #2] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[Practice #2] 
 
Probe question 
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[Start instructions] 
 
 
[Fixation] 
 
*Fixation was presented for  
2 seconds in the beginning of 
each trial. Hereafter this 
fixation page will be omitted 
due to space limit.  
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[1. Thin-Attractive-Peer] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[1. Thin-Attractive-Peer] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[1. Thin-Attractive-Peer] 
 
Probe question 
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[2. Thin-Attractive-Romance] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[2. Thin-Attractive-Romance] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[2. Thin-Attractive-Romance] 
 
Probe question 
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[3. Thin-Attractive-Public] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[3. Thin-Attractive-Public] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[3. Thin-Attractive-Public] 
 
Probe question 
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[4. Thin-Average Attractive-
Peer] 
 
Actor Manipulation 
 
 
[4. Thin-Average Attractive-
Peer] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[4. Thin-Average Attractive-
Peer] 
 
Probe question 
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[5. Thin-Average Attractive-
Romance] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[5. Thin-Average Attractive-
Romance] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[5. Thin-Average Attractive- 
Romance] 
 
Probe question 
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[6. Thin-Average Attractive-
Public] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[6. Thin-Average Attractive-
Public] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[6. Thin-Average Attractive-
Public] 
 
Probe question 
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[7. Heavy-Attractive-Peer] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[7. Heavy-Attractive-Peer] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[7. Heavy-Attractive-Peer] 
 
Probe question 
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[8. Heavy-Attractive-Romance] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[8. Heavy-Attractive- 
Romance] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[8. Heavy-Attractive- 
Romance] 
 
Probe question 
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[9. Heavy-Attractive-Public] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[9. Heavy-Attractive-Public] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[9. Heavy-Attractive-Public] 
 
Probe question 
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[10. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Peer] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[10. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Peer] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[10. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Peer] 
 
Probe question 
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[11. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Romance] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[11. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Romance] 
 
Scenario 
 
 
[11. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Romance] 
 
Probe question 
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[12. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Public] 
 
Actor manipulation 
 
 
[12. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Public] 
 
Ambiguous social event 
 
 
[12. Heavy-Average Attractive-
Public] 
 
Probe question 
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FIGURE OF WEIGHT SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION TASK LATENCY DISTRIBUTION 
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Figure. Weight Sorting Task Latency Distribution: Raw, outliers trimmed, and 
transformed latency variables 
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